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Individual identity is absurd in itself. It is excessively complex. 
Each one of us has our own, so identity is not uniform between people. 
In fact, we generally think that its purpose is to distinguish ourselves from 
others as well as from just being that guy or girl over there. Sometimes, 
our identity is tied to another person, object, circumstance, or idea. Some­
times, it is just a feeling, a presence. And as time passes, the item to which 
we think our identity is bound changes. Perhaps, as adults, we will all find 
that thing that is "me': or so we often tell ourselves. Perhaps, you have never 
given it direct or sustained thought. Perhaps, you are like me and have 
experienced periods of certainty, each instantaneously shattered by mo­
ments of instability or insecurity. But I believe that most of us, regardless 
of whether or not we are currently searching for it, believe that a uniform, 
fundamental, unwavering, core something-or-other exists: our identity as 
an individual. 
To accept that one is variable and conditional is near to accepting 
that this entity does not exist, and thinking that we do not exist violates all 
of our expectations at a fundamental level, which often leaves us confused, 
angry, or feeling hopeless, empty, or meaningless. To combat such emo­
tions, we associate ourselves with various other entities, whether concrete 
or conceptual. Usually, we select items that link to one conceptual category 
or, at most, a couple categories. Such categories are generally associated 
with the following types of terms: physical, mental, spiritual, and experien­
tial. These are all conceptual simplifications of human existence, but we use 
them for practical purposes related to communication, social structures, 
and knowledge. 
Reaching a Definition 
When we define ourselves by physical associations, we are usu­
ally relying on the appearance and function of tangible items to formulate 
ourselves into an expressible symbol. The assumption in this case is gener­
ally that an individual is his body, its components, and its functions. We 
witness this type of thinking when someone expresses that any given trait 
is genetically determined, implying that his traits, having a physical origin, 
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define him. The other types of self-identification are gradually less concrete 
and materialism-prone. But among them, the mentally-based associations 
are partially submerged in concrete entities, mainly the body. 
For most of recorded human history, as the western world has in­
terpreted it, the mind practically did not exist. It was the soul that guided 
our behavior, and the soul was, to some degree, separate from the body. 
Prior to Thomas Hobbes in the seventeenth century, these items, mind and 
soul, were interchangeable. No longer. Currently, one cannot reasonably 
assert that biology and the mind are not intertwined, and there is no room 
for the soul in the development or function of the body. In fact, knowledge 
of anatomy, physiology, and developmental processes has become essential 
in understanding the mind. It is clear that the mind and body function in 
unison: cross-communicating through hormones from endocrinic struc­
tures in the brain and elsewhere in the thorax, maintaining homeostasis, 
and reacting to the external environment. Certainly, the mind mediates 
between our body and our environment, but it also arises from our body 
and influences our body as well; moreover, interdependent objects cannot 
be considered distinct. A severed head does not think past its expiration 
date, and an expired body is a mindless one. Therefore, we must consider 
these objects, body and mind, indistinct from each other. 
When we speak of the spirit, as in any spiritually-based, self-entity 
association, this term is merely a synonym for "souI:' Therefore, we must 
assume that "spirit" has merely become an anachronism of "mind:' That 
doesn't seem to be how we think about "soul" or "spirit:' though. Rather, 
we most often say something is spiritual when referring to an essence. Like 
the smoke that drifts off of burning incense, the spirit is not graspable. 
Like the smoke that drifts off of burning incense, the spirit holds the least 
number of properties that give us the sense that one is a particular version 
among a general theme, such as people. People are like incense in that they 
come in different versions, but vary in essence, in vague being-sensation. 
Also, like incense, the concept of the spirit is often utilized with the goal 
of comforting ourselves when the body and mind are contingent on the 
momentary environment, both external and internal. 
I am fascinated by the idea of a rudimentary being and, therefore, 
the minimalistic approach that is evident in the concept of the soul. And 
I think we all are; thus, we search for a concise way to express who we are. 
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But to suggest that we are the spirit is to suggest that we are how we've qual­
ified it, so we are just as intangible and rudimentary. All of our extraneous 
traits wouldn't be us. I couldn't even touch you. Such logic is negligent and 
divisive. We cannot only be our soul. We cannot only be our rudimentary, 
essential qualities. These qualities wouldn't exist, if not for their physical 
origin. 
Whatever exists in our location, the experimental variety of self­
definition proposes that cumulative experiences determine who we are. It 
is implied then that experiences, if they are to accumulate, must be stored, 
retrieved, and built upon. What we're speaking of is long-term memory. 
Surely, we do not remember everything, and that is because in or­
der for information to enter our long-term memory, it must cycle through 
other facets of our memory, and each has a limited capacity. Our sensory 
memory stores all of the information coming from our sensory organs. The 
duration that sensory information can be stored varies considerably, such 
as with about 0.3 seconds for visual information and five to ten seconds 
for auditory information. But that is our unconscious. We do not actu­
ally know of these sensations until we pay attention to them. Once we pay 
attention to the sensation, or it barges into our attention by being more 
vivacious than other sensations, it is in our working memory. Working 
memory is, for all practical purposes, our consciousness. And we can at­
tend to five to nine items, depending on the size of the data, functioning 
similarly to a computer's RAM.l We smoothly maintain this information 
in our working memory by rehearsing it repeatedly, thus leading to the 
technical and complicated term, "maintenance rehearsal:' If we do not re­
hearse what we're attending to, it leaves our working memory about thirty 
seconds after we have attended to it (it is no surprise that people often 
forget what they are talking about or repeat themselves). Rehearsed in­
formation is then encoded into our long-term memory. Even during this 
whole process, information is being retrieved from the long-term memory 
into the working memory, thus affecting the storage capacity, frequency, 
and efficiency, as well as the interpretation of the information. As a result 
of our mind's limited capacity, our memories are mostly bits-and-pieces 
tacked on to pre-existing memories, leaving room for much ambiguity. 
Another flaw-causing agent is that old memories that are retrieved 
1 Random-access memory. 
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are re-encoded into long -term memory to account for the context in which 
they were last remembered, slightly altering them, mostly where ambiguity 
exists. 
Of course, memory is not just explicit things we can remember. 
We also have implicit memory, which includes various subconscious 
things like conditioned responses to stimuli and memories that guide us on 
procedures that we no longer "think" about, like walking. In other words, 
memories do account for a significant portion of our unconscious behavior 
as well. 
Despite the flaws in memory, my major distaste for an experien­
tially-based definition of one's identity is actually that all of the processes 
required for memory are biologically originating and driven, yet a solely 
experiential theory about identity doesn't usually give our physical nature 
the credit that is due. At the same time, purely physical theories of iden­
tity usually neglect that mental phenomena have cumulative processes that 
may alter our biology and behavior. So what we need is an interactive ap­
proach to understanding identity, and I think the best source lies in how we 
know that we exist as ourselves. 
"I Think; Therefore, I Am." 
There is a little truth to the statement. Knowledge that we exist 
literally comes from the fact that we think. Or rather, the processes of 
knowing we exist and rudimentary thought are cross-wired. In fact, neu­
roscientist Antonio Damasio, in a TED Talk, describes how the midbrain is 
responsible for forming both processes. The posterior half of the midbrain 
maps the internal body. This map lets it know whether or not we are deviat­
ing from our homeostasis. By definition, homeostasis never changes, since 
it is the balance that allows our body to function. In fact, if we deviate from 
our homeostasis, we become ill or die. The midbrain's map of our homeo­
stasis is the single map of information in our mind that is stationary. More 
interestingly, the anterior portion of the midbrain is wired to the cerebral 
cortex, where all of our memories, thoughts and the like are held. This 
means that all of our cognitive experiences-thoughts, memories, emo­
tions-may feed into the anterior midbrain. And by association via prox­
imity' the map of ourselves and the map of our knowledge and experiences 
of the internal and external world are linked. Because the anterior and pos-
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terior midbrain sections are fused and, thereby, all of our experiences are 
continuously checked against our internal map, we always know how we 
relate to ourselves and our environment. The midbrain lets us know, as we 
are conscious in the prefrontal cortex, in the form of a feeling. We may not 
always be aware of this feeling, however, since our mind reacts primarily 
to changes in states, and you shouldn't be "feeling off " unless your homeo­
stasis has changed-you are ill. Even so, that doesn't mean this emotion 
cannot be felt. I believe it is what meditation evokes; when nothing else 
is sensed or thought, it is equanimity. When something else is sensed or 
thought, it is identity. 
While I cannot cognitively handle trying to process every individ­
ual component that makes "me" on every possible level of analysis, from 
the subatomic to the fusion of "me" and my cross-dependent environment, 
I feel that I exist. As far as biology is concerned, that is knowledge. 
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